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ABSTRACT 
This paper provides new insights on the determinants of firm exit after distress. Using nested 
logit models and a sample of 6118 distress-related exits from Belgium, we analyze the impacts 
of available and potential slack and the relative efficiency of voluntary liquidation, compared to 
acquisition and merger, on the type of exit. It appears essential to examine the type of exit 
outcome as a two-stage process. The first stage considers the fundamental distinction between 
voluntary and involuntary exit, the latter being the least favorable and most avoided exit 
strategy. In this situation, high levels of available and potential slack resources, as reflected by 
large cash holdings, strong group relations and low current leverage, increase the probability of 
voluntary exit. High slack allows distressed firms to avoid bankruptcy and decide on their exit 
process. In the second stage, and provided that exit is voluntary, voluntary liquidation is 
compared to restructuring exit (acquisition, merger or split). In this stage, a higher relative 
efficiency of voluntary liquidation compared to a restructuring exit, as indicated by absence of 
group relations, small firm size, high secured debt level and large cash holdings, increase the 
likelihood of voluntary liquidation and reduce the probability of a restructuring exit.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
As a result of a situation of economic distress, firms may eventually exit. Besides 
entering an involuntary exit procedure, a distressed firm has other exit options. For example, it 
may choose to exit in a more efficient and orderly way through voluntary liquidation. 
Alternatively, it may opt for acquisition by another firm (Astebro and Winter, 2001) or a 
merger. Bulow and Shoven (1978) and Shrieves and Stevens (1979) suggest that bankruptcy 
avoidance may motivate mergers. Especially during the past decade, acquisitions and mergers 
have appeared as more favorable exit alternatives in many continental European countries. An 
intriguing question in this respect concerns the reasons why some firms exit involuntarily (by 
bankruptcy), while other firms exit by a voluntary liquidation or by an acquisition or merger. 
Given that the eventual exit type may have important implications for a distressed firm’s 
stakeholders, including creditors, shareholders, lenders, employees, customers, suppliers, 
related firms, government, and the economy as a whole, this research question is important. 
Moreover, in the context of the current global economic downturn, this question is both timely 
and relevant. However, until now, surprisingly little is known about the determinants of a 
distressed firm’s exit type.  
There are several reasons for this lack of insight into the determinants of the type of 
distress-related exit. First, most academic studies on corporate failure and business failure paths 
simplify the concept of business failure to bankruptcy exit alone and do not look at the 
alternative forms of exit available to firms. Even the empirical studies that have emerged with 
the recent resurgence of interest in studies on corporate failure strongly focus on involuntary 
exit in the form of bankruptcy. These studies are flawed in that they ignore the fact that 
voluntary exit types, such as voluntary liquidation, acquisition and merger, are alternatives to 
bankruptcy. A further issue that is largely ignored in these studies is that not all bankruptcies 
are related to failures. Although a bankruptcy declaration is often based on poor liquidity and/or 
solvency, some bankruptcies are simply the result of a strategic decision not preceded by 
distress. Financially stable firms may file for a bankruptcy because they simply want to rid 
themselves of their debts and restart business activity with a clean sheet. Alternatively, some 
bankruptcies result from sudden and unexpected events, such as a natural disaster. The implicit 
inclusion of ‘sudden bankruptcies’, reflecting strategic decisions (Hill et al., 1996), and 
‘accidental bankruptcies’, resulting from an unexpected event (Davis and Huang, 2004) may 
result in biased conclusions about the determinants of failure paths.  
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Furthermore, most empirical studies about corporate failure and business failure paths 
are based on small samples of large (listed) firms and, therefore, have a rather low external 
validity. For example, Laitinen (1992), Laitinen (1991, 1993, 1994), Luoma and Laitinen 
(1991), and Van Wymeersch and Wolfs (1996) sample only 20, 40, 36 and 136 failing firms, 
respectively. Together, these three shortcomings are associated with a lack of insight into the 
broader phenomenon of business failure. Second, prior studies on distress-related exit mostly 
have a limited scope. An important limitation is that they do not consider multiple exit types 
and often compare only two exit alternatives. Also, they mostly are based on small samples and 
only observe the distressed firms close to exit, ignoring information from a broad pre-exit 
window (Pastena and Ruland, 1986; Peel and Wilson, 1989; Kanatas and Qi, 2004).  
In this study, we extend the narrow concept of business failure, which is strongly 
associated with involuntary exit (bankruptcy), with all possible types of exit as an outcome of 
distress. We explore the concept of distress-related exit, considering multiple exit types, and 
attempt to identify the determinants of the exit type by investigating several firm characteristics 
at the first signs of distress and at the time of exit. With this multistate approach to distress-
related exit, we fill an important gap in the existing literature on business failure and firm exit. 
We distinguish between three main exit types: (1) involuntary exit, following bankruptcy, 
compulsory liquidation or reorganization procedure; (2) voluntary liquidation; and (3) 
restructuring exit, being an acquisition, merger or split. In this study, the term ‘restructuring 
exit’ is not related to reorganization or internal firm restructurings, but it rather indicates that 
the eventual exit results from an external, legal restructuring, such as a merger or an acquisition. 
To account for the fundamental distinction between involuntary and voluntary exits, we employ 
a two-stage approach. In the first stage, voluntary exit is an alternative outcome to involuntary 
exit; in the second stage, and providing exit is voluntary, voluntary liquidation is compared to a 
restructuring exit. The reason for this fundamental partition into involuntary and voluntary exits 
is that an involuntary exit is clearly the most unfavorable exit option. In a situation of distress, 
managers will try to avoid involuntary exit because, unlike the voluntary exit types, it involves 
the greater destruction of economic value and provides only partial compensation for 
stakeholders. As a result, an involuntary exit is likely to be driven by different determinants 
than the voluntary exit types. Provided that a distressed firm is able to avoid involuntary exit, it 
can voluntarily decide about the desired exit mode, being a voluntary liquidation or a 
restructuring exit in the form of an acquisition or merger. In this second stage, it is not clear 
which exit type is most favourable.  
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In both situations, external stakeholders recover most of their contributions. By 
considering firm exit as a choice, our focus on organizational mortality complements the 
existing literature on business failure, where exit is mostly seen as being enforced by the firm’s 
environment and hostile to the firm. 
Guided by organization theory on slack resources and literature about strategic 
management, this study investigates how the level of slack resources and the relative efficiency 
of the voluntary exit systems at the start and at the end of the exit process determine the exit 
type as an outcome of distress. We argue that the available and potential slack resources 
contribute to avoiding forced exit and, hence, determine the probability of involuntary exit 
compared to voluntary exit. Further, we argue that the relative efficiency of voluntary 
liquidation as compared to a restructuring exit, explains the type of voluntary exit, being a 
voluntary liquidation or a restructuring exit. These research questions are investigated using a 
large Belgian sample of 6,118 distress-related exits of nonstarting firms, including 
bankruptcies, voluntary liquidations and restructuring exits (i.e. acquisitions and mergers). This 
sample mainly includes small and medium-sized, privately held firms. All firms are more 
mature, as we exclude starting firms whose exit decisions may be very different from those of 
mature firms. First, we show that high available and potential slack resources decrease the 
probability of an involuntary exit, while the relative efficiency of voluntary liquidation 
compared to a restructuring exit determines the type of voluntary exit.  
By providing empirical evidence on the determinants of the exit type of firms that have 
experienced a situation of distress, this paper contributes to the literature about the process of 
business failure and firm exit. More specifically, the simultaneous analysis of all possible exits 
as an outcome of distress—including bankruptcy, voluntary liquidation and different types of 
restructuring exit—fills a gap in the existing literature and allows new theoretical and practical 
insights into which exit strategies are employed. Moreover, the two-stage specification of the 
eventual exit outcome allows us to understand better the effects of diverse explanatory factors 
and the dynamics that play in the exit process. Further, by demonstrating the effect of slack 
resources and the relative efficiency of voluntary liquidation on the type of exit after distress, 
our study contributes to the literature on slack resources and to the strategic management 
literature. Additional contributions of this paper to the existing literature are fourfold. First, the 
richness of our dataset allows analysis of the effects of available and potential slack resources 
and the relative efficiency of voluntary liquidation and restructuring exit as exit systems on the 
type of exit path.  
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Second, the analysis of a large sample of distress-related exits in Belgium including a 
substantial number of small and privately owned unlisted firms—which have been largely 
neglected in previous studies about firm exit and business failure—makes it possible to draw 
conclusions that can be more readily generalized. As the sample includes all exits from the 
period 1998-2000 and does not result from further selection criteria, selection biases are 
minimized. Third, the focus on the exit of non-starting more mature firms, which act differently 
compared to new or starting firms confronted with distress, allows conclusions to be generated 
for categories of exits that have until now remained largely unexplored. Finally, by considering 
historical firm information from a broad pre-exit window up to 10 years prior to exit, this study 
adds significantly to the existing business failure studies, which are often limited to the 
investigation of firm information close to exit. 
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the 
literature on distress-related exit. It also briefly summarizes the various exit opportunities for 
distressed firms and explains the need for a two-stage modeling approach. Section 3 formulates 
hypotheses about the effect of slack resources and the relative efficiency of voluntary 
liquidation versus restructuring exit on the exit type. Section 4 elaborates on the sample of 
distress-related exits, the nested logit methodolgy that is used to identify the exit type 
determinants and the variables. Section 5 reports the results of the nested logit models and 
section 6 summarizes the most important conclusions and gives suggestions for further 
research. 
 
2. DISTRESS-RELATED EXIT AND EXIT TYPES 
 
2.1. Exit types of distressed firms 
When exiting, a firm has several exit opportunities: involuntary exit, voluntary 
liquidation and restructuring exit. The first exit type, involuntary exit, may involve bankruptcy 
procedures (i.e., Chapter 11 in the U.S.), or a winding-up enforced by the court (also known as 
compulsory liquidation). Worldwide, bankruptcy procedures are usually part of insolvency 
regulation for financially distressed firms, allowing an appropriate person (i.e., the 
manager/owner or a creditor) to file for bankruptcy. Specific commissioners are then assigned 
with the task of sorting out the distribution of the firm’s assets to compensate for the debt 
claims and then of liquidating the assets.  
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In most cases, the economic consequences of bankruptcy are that the firm’s stakeholders 
are only partially paid and the firm’s operations is permanently closed. In the case of a judicial 
winding-up, the court makes an order for the firm to be liquidated on the petition of an 
appropriate person. This procedure is used less frequently than bankruptcy procedures.  
The second exit outcome is voluntary liquidation. The shareholders can on their own 
decide to voluntary liquidate a firm when the liquidation value of the assets exceeds the 
liquidation value of the liabilities. In this situation, the firm is able to settle all its liabilities 
from the proceeds of the liquidation of the assets. The remaining liquidation proceeds accrue to 
the shareholders. Shareholders are likely to opt for a voluntary liquidation when the firm’s 
going-concern value of the firm is less than the value of the firm’s assets. If the liquidation 
value of the assets does not allow covering the outstanding liabilities, the creditors have to 
formally approve the liquidation procedure and the liquidation plan. They also retain the right 
to call for a bankruptcy, if this would appear to increase their chances of recovering their 
accounts (Dewaelheyns and van Hulle, 2008). In that situation, shareholders get nothing out of 
the liquidation procedure. With a voluntary liquidation, the directors and owner/shareholders 
hence willingly agree to initiate a liquidation procedure, without outside pressure or order from 
the Court of Commerce or from creditors. The firm is liquidated upon voluntary decision of the 
directors and shareholders.  
The third exit category is the restructuring exit. This refers to all exits of a voluntary 
nature where a firm undergoes a major transformation. This causes a change in the firm’s legal 
identity and the firm disappears without a liquidation procedure. A restructuring exit may lead 
to (1) an acquisition or takeover by another firm, possibly a healthy industry rival or a related 
firm; (2) a merger with another firm involving the foundation of a new firm and the 
disappearance of the merged firms; or (3) a split whereby the distressed company is 
decomposed into several units, which may be sold or reappear as new firms. Unlike involuntary 
exit and voluntary liquidation, much of the firm’s productive capacity is reused in the economy 
with a restructuring exit. Moreover, a restructuring exit does not require a final distribution of 
properties, nor does it require a total discharge of debts. For example, in the case of an 
acquisition, debts are often secured by the new company.   
When comparing involuntary exit with voluntary exit types, it is obvious that the 
involuntary exit can be considered as the most unfavorable exit type for a distressed firm.  
It entails the greater destruction of economic value, hence reducing the number of 
stakeholders being fully compensated and increasing the number incurring losses. Moreover, 
taxes due are often not fully paid.  
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As this is the least favorable option for many stakeholders, including shareholders, who 
are the residual claimants and usually receive nothing (Bulow and Shoven, 1978), firms usually 
attempt to avoid an involuntary exit. Conversely, with a voluntary exit, all external stakeholders 
are usually compensated, and only shareholders may suffer losses. In addition, and in contrast 
to a voluntary exit as the result of ‘entrepreneurial self-selection’, an involuntary exit involves a 
juridical procedure that is often initiated by external parties (financial institutions, companies, 
individuals and/or government) and therefore fits into the ‘external selection’ exit mechanism 
(Prantl, 2003). 
 
2.2. Literature review 
There is a recent upsurge in studies on the determinants of firm exits, distinguishing 
between different types of exits. Some studies focus on owner characteristics in entrepreneurial 
firm exits (e.g. Harhoff et al., 1998; Prantl, 2003; Leroy et al., 2009). The current study, 
however, focuses on firm characteristics that determine whether a firm has a higher probability 
of exiting through different exit modes. A firm has a higher probability of going bankrupt 
compared to being acquired when the firm is older and larger (Buehler et al., 2006, in a sample 
of Swiss firms), has a low asset quality, low earnings and high managerial efficiency 
(Wheelock and Wilson, 2000, in a sample of 4000 commercial U.S. banks). Further, a firm has 
a higher probability of going bankrupt compared to being voluntarily liquidated when it is 
larger – both at start-up (Prantl, 2003) and at exit (Harhoff et al., 1998) – and when it is a 
subsidiary rather than an independent firm (Harhoff et al., 1998; Prantl, 2003). Also, a limited 
liability status and diversification lowers the probability of voluntary liquidation (Harhoff et al., 
1998). Few studies distinguish between exiting through a merger or acquisition and voluntary 
liquidation. Entrepreneurial firms have a higher probability of being acquired, rather than being 
voluntarily liquidated, when they are larger and more profitable (Leroy et al., 2009).  
Few studies to date distinguish between multiple exit types, however. Most studies use a 
binary approach, comparing only two outcomes, e.g. bankruptcy versus acquisition. Exceptions 
are Köke (2002), who distinguishes bankruptcy, acquisition and survival, but fails to find 
determinants of bankruptcy versus acquisition.  
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Further, Schary (1991) uses a four-state multinomial logit model to distinguish between 
bankruptcy, voluntary liquidation, merger and survival, and Cefis and Marsili (2007) 
distinguish between bankruptcies and voluntary closures, mergers and acquisitions, and exits 
through radical restructuring, comparing these three exit types with a group of continuing firms. 
Jones and Hensher (2007) use a nested tree structure to compare insolvent firms, distressed 
acquisitions and outright failures with surviving firms. Interestingly, while these studies 
confirm earlier findings on characteristics that distinguish between exit and survival, they find 
few characteristics that distinguish between different exit types. Neither firm profitability nor 
other firm characteristics, such as firm size, number of plants or financial reserves explain the 
difference between bankruptcy and other exits, like acquisition (Schary, 1991; Köke, 2002). 
Only the industry type is found to explain the exit outcome, with bankruptcies being relatively 
more prevalent in clothing, machinery and construction of other vehicles (in particular 
shipyards) and takeovers being relatively more prevalent in ore mining, rock and stone mining, 
paper and metals (Köke, 2002). Although the degree of financial leverage does not distinguish 
between bankruptcy and acquisition (Schary, 1991; Köke, 2002), a larger total debt to total 
equity it is found to increase the probability of an outright failure compared to insolvency or  
distressed merger (Jones and Hensher, 2007).  
Little is known to date, however, on how distressed firms exit, as most exit studies 
ignore whether firms are distressed or financially healthy before exiting. Except from Jones and 
Hensher (2007), all above mentioned studies compare different exit types or simply compare 
firms that exit with financially healthy firms that survive. Some studies focus on exit of 
distressed firms, however, thereby taking a binary outcome approach (Peel and Wilson, 1989; 
Pastena and Ruland, 1986; Kanatas and Qi, 2004). Distressed firms have a higher probability of 
exiting through an acquisition rather than going bankrupt, if they have a more favorable 
liquidity profile and are less levered (Peel and Wilson, 1989). Further, the probability of a 
merger as an alternative to bankruptcy is higher for firms with a lower leverage, a larger size or 
a high ownership concentration (Pastena and Ruland, 1986). Additionally, distressed firms have 
a higher probability of exiting through an acquisition rather than being voluntarily liquidated if 
they have a higher leverage (Kanatas and Qi, 2004). Besides the limitations of the binary 
approach, another weakness of the few studies focusing on the exit type of distressed firms is 
that they use a small sample of merely 72 (Peel and Wilson, 1989) or 110 distressed exits 
(Pastena and Ruland, 1986). These studies might hence be prone to sample selection biases. 
Further, they focus on firm characteristics close to exit and ignore information from a broader 
pre-exit window.  
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Not all firms exit shortly after having experienced a distress situation, however (Balcaen 
et al., 2009). For example, firms may first try to restructure in order to survive as an 
independent entity. It is hence likely that firm characteristics may change considerably between 
the first signs of distress and the exit.  
The current study addresses shortcomings in the literature by focusing on exits of 
distressed firms, thereby distinguishing between multiple outcomes. More specifically, 
bankruptcy, voluntary liquidation, and acquisitions and mergers are distinguished by using a 
multistate approach on a large unbiased sample of distress-related exits. We examine whether 
there are differences between the determinants of these exit types, conditional on a firm having 
experienced economic problems and exiting. To account for the fundamental distinction 
between involuntary and voluntary exit, we examine the exit type outcome of a distressed firm 
as a two-step process by applying a two-stage modeling approach. In a first stage, involuntary 
exit is compared to voluntary exit. At this stage, involuntary exit is avoided unless the 
distressed firm has no other alternatives. In a second stage, and provided that the exit is 
voluntary, voluntary liquidation is compared to a restructuring exit. Having been able to avoid a 
bankruptcy, the distressed firm can voluntarily decide about the desired exit mode. For some 
firms, voluntary liquidation may be the most efficient exit option, while for other firms, an 
acquisition or a merger (i.e. a restructuring exit) is more efficient. In both situations, external 
stakeholders recover most of their contributions to the firm. Shareholders usually prefer an 
acquisition over a liquidation, as in case of an acquisition they receive shares or cash from the 
acquiring firm and there is still the opportunity for positive abnormal returns, while in the case 
of voluntary liquidation, they usually receive very little or nothing (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; 
Pastena and Ruland, 1986). A restructuring exit is, however, not always the most efficient exit 
option compared to voluntary liquidation. Although it is often asserted that a takeover or 
merger is a better exit option than liquidation, a voluntary liquidation may in some cases appear 
as the most optimal or most efficient exit system (Caves and Porter, 1976; Ghosh et al., 1991; 
Gimeno et al., 1997; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001). This will depend on the conditions 
underlying the exit decision and the associated level of efficiency of the respective exit systems. 
Further, firm characteristics at the first sign of distress and close to exit are included in the 
study, which allows for extension of the existing literature. 
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3. DETERMINANTS OF EXIT TYPE 
First, this study investigates how the level of available slack and potential slack 
resources at the first sign of distress and at the time of exit determine the probability of 
involuntary exit, as a less favorable exit type compared to voluntary exit. Guided by 
organization theory, we argue that higher levels of slack resources will allow firms to avoid 
involuntary exit and opt for a more favorable, voluntary exit type, such as voluntary liquidation, 
acquisition or merger. Second, we suggest that the type of voluntary exit will depend on the 
relative efficiency of the two voluntary exit systems of voluntary liquidation and restructuring 
exit. We hence investigate how different factors affecting the probability of a successful 
voluntary liquidation and the probability of a successful restructuring exit impact the exit type 
outcome.  
 
3.1. Voluntary versus involuntary exit 
Organization theory sees a firm as an entity that seeks survival as the ultimate goal. In 
order to survive, a firm should be able to adapt to its environment and protect its core (Hannan 
and Freeman, 1989). In this context, firms accumulate slack resources, because organizational 
slack acts as a buffer to protect their core from environmental pressures and (short-term) 
random fluctuations in the environment (Cyert and March, 1963; Thompson, 1967; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978; Bromily, 1991; Cheng and Kesner, 1997). Bourgeois (1981) defines 
“organizational slack” as “that cushion of actual or potential resources which allow an 
organization to adapt successfully to internal pressures for adjustment or to external pressures 
for change in policy as well as to initiate changes in strategy with respect to the external 
environment. (p. 30)”. Organizational slack serves as a resource to tackle problems (Sharfman 
et al., 1988) and as an enhancer of strategic behavior, such as firm expansion, innovation or 
valuable alliances, especially in situations of environmental shifts and strategic uncertainty 
(Cyert and March, 1963; Thompson, 1967; Bourgeois, 1981; Cheng and Kesner, 1997; Tan and 
Peng, 2003). In uncertain environments – for example financial distress, recessions, demand 
shocks – the presence of slack resources mitigates risks and allows firms to survive (Sharfman 
et al., 1988; Tan and Peng, 2003; Latham and Braun, 2008). Slack resources are defined as 
resources that are “visible to the manager and employable in the future” (Sharfman et al., 1988, 
p. 602). High discretion slack resources are currently uncommitted resources that are relatively 
liquid and can easily be redeployed in a wide variety of situations (Singh, 1986; Sharfman et 
al., 1988; Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988; Voss, Sirdeshmukh and Voss, 2008).  
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Examples are cash holdings, marketable securities or credit lines. Low-discretion slack 
resources – also called absorbed slack or recoverable slack – can only be used in particular 
situations and may require considerable organizational changes before the firm can use them. 
Examples are excess machine capacity, inventories, work in progress, accounts payable and 
accounts receivable (Bourgeois and Singh, 1983; Sharfman et al., 1988; Bromiley, 1991; Miller 
and Lieblein, 1996; Cheng and Kesner, 1997; Reuer and Lieblein, 2000; Voss at al., 2008; 
Latham and Braun, 2008). As a situation of environmental uncertainty and distress typically 
increases the need for high-discretion slack resources (Sharfmann et al., 1988; Latham and 
Braun, 2008), this study on distress-related exits focuses on  high-discretion slack resources, 
hereby following the approach of Cheng and Kesner (1997), Sharfman et al. (1988), and 
Bourgeois (1981). Bourgeois and Singh (1983), Bromiley (1991) and Cheng and Kesner (1997) 
further distinguish between “available slack” and “potential slack”. While the available slack is 
immediately available in the firm, the potential slack has not yet entered the firm, but is 
accessible within a short time frame. Potential slack are future resources that can be generated 
from the environment.   
Given the theorized role of slack resources in highly uncertain environments, the role of 
slack resources may be even more pertinent in a situation where a firm experiences distress and 
where involuntary exit poses a threat. As the involuntary exit is the most unfavorable exit type 
for a distressed firm and many of its stakeholders, firms usually try to avoid this type of exit. 
Slack resources may play an essential role in this choice1. More specifically, we expect that 
high slack resources contribute to avoiding involuntary exit and allow a distressed firm to opt 
for a more favorable, voluntary liquidation or M&A. Distressed firms with high levels of 
available and potential slack resources are expected to have a higher probability to avoid a 
forced bankruptcy. First, high levels of slack resources make voluntary liquidation easier, as it 
is more probable that sufficient cash is present (available cash) or can be raised from affiliated 
parties (potential slack) to fully repay all creditors. Second, high levels of slack resources 
decrease the probability of an involuntary exit. High available slack resources allow to absorb 
changes, resist to environmental pressures and tackle problems that may threaten survival. If the 
situation of distress goes along with a restricted access to external financial resources, high 
levels of available slack allow distressed firms to (at least temporary) continue their operations 
and activities that constitute their core to survival. In other words, the existing slack resources 
act as a "rainy-day" buffer (Latham and Braun, 2008). This, in turn, increases the probability of 
a voluntary exit. Further, a high level of available slack allows for a greater flexibility in 
adaptation to the situation of distress.  
 14 
 
For example, financial slack in the form of cash can be used to acquire the resources 
that are necessary to implement a strategic change (Latham and Braun, 2008), again increasing 
the probability of survival and a voluntary exit. In a similar way, high potential slack – induced 
by additional slack resources that can be mobilized from the parent or related firm or cash 
raised by additional funding in the form of debts – increases the capabilities to avoid a forced 
bankruptcy, to survive and ultimately to exit in a voluntary way. Thus, from an organizational 
theory perspective, we predict that firms entering into distress with ample available and 
potential slack resources will be more able to avoid involuntary exit and opt for a more 
favorable, voluntary exit type. On the contrary, in distressed firms with insufficient slack 
resources, the deterioration of the distressed situation is likely to accelerate, causing ever-lower 
levels of resources. As a result, we expect that in firms with low available and potential slack 
resources, an involuntary exit is likely to become inevitable, even in an early stage following 
the first signs of distress. These firms are more likely to be subjected to involuntary exit. Hence:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Available slack resources have a positive effect on the likelihood of a 
voluntary exit compared to involuntary exit 
 
Hypothesis 2: Potential slack resources have a positive effect on the likelihood of a 
voluntary exit compared to involuntary exit 
 
Current cash and cash equivalents reflect the level of available slack, while the level of 
potential slack resources is determined by the future accessibility of additional resources. 
Indicators that reflect potential slack are the strength of group relations and current leverage. 
The latter, negative indicator of potential slack largely determines the future borrowing 
capacity. We will elaborate on each of these indicators of slack resources. 
 
 15 
 
Cash holdings 
Cash and cash equivalents (together labeled cash holdings) are available slack resources 
because they involve currently uncommitted resources that can easily be redeployed for various 
purposes (Sharfman et al., 1988). Myers and Majluf (1984), for instance, define cash holdings 
as ‘financial slack’. Firms may maintain large cash holdings, far in excess of their transactions 
needs, as a buffer to meet unexpected contingencies to ensure survival (Baum et al., 2006a, 
2006b). For this reason, high levels of cash holdings may be viewed as “options purchased by 
the firms’ managers that may be exercised in adverse times in order to ensure firm survival” 
(Baum et al., 2006a, p. 4). In case of distress, cash provides a firm with financial resources that 
allow to absorb financial problems and to offset potential difficulties in its access to credit or 
other external financing and/or to initiate strategic changes so as to adapt to the pressures from 
the external environment.  
 
Group relations 
Group relations are a source of potential slack resources (Ringlstetter, 1995). As group 
relations enable firms to establish an ‘internal capital market’ where resources are reallocated 
across firms, they facilitate the mobilization of slack resources (Shin and Stultz, 1998). In this 
manner, they can (partly) overcome the problems related to information asymmetries in the 
external capital market, as group member firms usually have more information on the focal 
firm’s prospects than outside investors (Deloof and Jegers, 1996). For example, firms that are 
part of a group may be able to absorb unexpected cash shortages by speeding up the collection 
of intragroup receivables (Deloof and Jegers, 1996). Similarly, in a distressed situation, related 
firms may provide different forms of financial support, such as equity participation, 
subordinated loans or guarantees. Because of the existence of an internal capital market, 
subsidiaries are likely to benefit from support of the group to which they belong, especially 
when they belong to the core of the group (De Waelheyns and Van Hulle, 2006). An affiliate is 
likely to receive the necessary financial support from its parent firm, because the parent firm 
may be liable for the obligations of its affiliate or because of reputation effects. The bankruptcy 
of an affiliate could be viewed as a signal of the forthcoming bankruptcy of the parent firm. 
Accordingly, to preserve its reputation, a parent firm is likely to help to avoid the bankruptcy of 
its distressed affiliates (Prantl, 2003).    
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Current leverage 
The business failure literature unanimously indicates a high debt level as one of the 
most important bankruptcy determinants (e.g. Dimitras et al., 1996; Daubie and Meskens, 
2002). Alternatively, firms with a higher borrowing capacity have a higher probability of being 
able to raise additional cash through raising new debt. An important indicator of the future 
borrowing capacity of a firm is its current leverage. Contrary to firms with more equity and 
more unused debt capacity, a firm with a high leverage may experience difficulties in accessing 
additional financial resources. This low level of potential slack leads to a higher vulnerability to 
external pressures. As a result, a high current leverage is an indicator of a low level of potential 
slack (Singh, 1986).  
 
3.2. Voluntary liquidation versus restructuring exit 
If a distressed firm is able to avoid involuntary exit, it has the opportunity to decide on 
the voluntary type of exit, being a voluntary liquidation or a restructuring exit. At this stage, it 
is unclear which type of exit is the most favorable. With both exit types, external stakeholders 
have a high probability of recovering most of their liabilities. Strategy literature argues that, in a 
situation of underperformance, a voluntary liquidation or dissolution becomes more appealing 
when the firm's owners, who have a residual claim over the assets and resources, notice 
interesting alternative uses for these resources and when the assets can be liquidated for a high 
value (Caves and Porter, 1976; Porter, 1976; Gimeno et al., 1997). Further, studies on 
(distressed) firm acquisitions argue that the probability of firm exit by acquisition depends on 
the underlying conditions that constitute the attractiveness of an acquisition by another firm as a 
strategic option for the firm, such as the probability of receiving a reasonable buy-out price 
(Ghosh et al., 1991; Clark and Ofek, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1996; Maksimovic and Phillips, 
2001; Astebro and Winter, 2001; Kanatas and Qi, 2004). This suggests that the owners’ 
motivation to liquidate will depend on the relative efficiency of voluntary liquidation as an exit 
alternative, compared to the relative efficiency of acquisition as an exit alternative.  
Given the efficiency-related arguments that substantiate the motivation of the owners to 
opt for liquidation or a restructuring exit, we propose that the relative efficiency of a voluntary 
liquidation compared to a restructuring exit determines the eventual exit type in a situation of 
distress. We expect a distressed firm to opt for the relatively most efficient voluntary exit 
option.  
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This depends on the specific conditions underlying the exit decision and the associated 
success probability. If the probability of a successful liquidation is high, which increases the 
relative efficiency of voluntary liquidation, the firm’s owners will be more motivated to opt for 
voluntary liquidation as an exit mode, instead of an acquisition or merger. On the contrary, if a 
restructuring exit is more likely to be successful, which decreases the relative efficiency of 
voluntary liquidation, the distressed firm is more likely to choose an acquisition or merger. As a 
result, we predict that a distressed firm will be more likely to exit by a voluntary liquidation 
when the relative efficiency of voluntary liquidation, as compared to a restructuring exit, is 
high. On the contrary, it will be more likely to exit by an acquisition or merger when the 
relative efficiency of voluntary liquidation, as compared to a restructuring exit, is low. This 
leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The relative efficiency of voluntary liquidation, as compared to a 
restructuring exit has a positive effect on the likelihood of voluntary liquidation 
compared to a restructuring exit. 
 
The relative efficiency of voluntary liquidation compared to a restructuring exit is 
observed through various factors affecting the probability of a successful liquidation and the 
probability of a successful restructuring exit. We include business group membership, firm size, 
secured debt level, debt level, cash holdings and firm performance.     
 
Business group membership 
First, business group membership has a negative effect on the probability of a successful 
liquidation, because of reputation effects at the level of the parent firm. A liquidation of a 
subsidiary or affiliate may cause stakeholders to fear forthcoming distress in the parent 
company and this may, in turn, cause a considerable loss of reputation of the parent firm 
(Prantl, 2003). In order to preserve their own reputation, parent firms tend to avoid liquidation 
of their subsidiaries and affiliates and prefer a sale. In addition, business group membership 
positively affects the probability of a successful restructuring exit for two reasons. First, 
business group membership positively influences the probability of finding a third party that is 
willing to contract with the firm as a buyer or a merger partner.  
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Group relations involving parent relationships and cross-participations with related 
firms may allow firms to use their networks to find potential buyers or merger partners, within 
or outside of the group structure (Dewaelheyns and van Hulle, 2008) and this facilitates 
acquisition or merger. Within a group context, there is a chance of an intragroup acquisition or 
merger with a related firm. Further, affiliates that are partly or fully owned by a parent firm 
generally benefit from the parent firm's network, funding, and knowledge (Mata and Portugal, 
2002). Second, the creditors, including banks, may have stronger incentives to cooperate in a 
restructuring exit when the distressed firm is a member of a group, compared to a stand-alone 
company (Dewaelheyns and van Hulle, 2008).  
As a result, because of its negative effect on the probability of a successful liquidation 
and its positive effect on the probability of a successful restructuring exit, business group 
membership indicates a lower relative efficiency of voluntary liquidation, compared to 
acquisition or merger.  
 
Firm size  
Firm size may negatively influence the probability of a successful liquidation. A first 
reason is stakeholder intervention. Larger firms generally have a larger network of stakeholders. 
They have more employees – possibly represented by trade unions – a larger network of 
suppliers, a larger customer base, more shareholders (multiple owners instead of a sole owner, 
who may also be the manager), a larger number of banks with whom they have contracted 
loans, and so forth. These firms have a lower freedom of action and radical strategic changes 
are more likely to involve opposition by stakeholders. In case of an impending liquidation, the 
probability of stakeholder intervention is high. Also, as an external stakeholder, government – 
represented by various public instances – is likely to intervene and attempt to avoid liquidation. 
A second reason is the higher going concern value. A large firm size generally indicates a 
higher going concern value and this makes liquidation less attractive. When going concern 
value is high, liquidation would cause much going concern value to be lost.  
Further, firm size may have a positive effect on the probability of a successful 
restructuring exit (Harhoff et al., 1998; Leroy et al., 2009; Praet, 2008). First, the probability of 
finding a suitable acquisition or merger partner is higher for large firms. Large firms receive 
more attention because they are more likely to be the subject of large transactions (Diamond 
and Verrecchia, 1991).  
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Moreover, external parties, including potential takeover or merger partners, are better 
able to make an accurate assessment of the firm’s financial health, which increases their 
willingness to act as a partner in a restructuring project. This is the result of the larger 
information content of financial statements (Vermaelen, 1981; Zeghal, 1984; Chari et al., 1988; 
Bharath et al., 2006, 2007) and the fact that there is more voluntary disclosed information 
and/or alternative sources of information. Second, going concern value is generally higher in 
large firms. This implies a high takeover price and increases the probability of a successful 
restructuring exit.  
Consequently, having a negative effect on the probability of a successful liquidation 
procedure and a positive effect on the probability of a successful restructuring exit, a large firm 
size indicates a lower relative efficiency of voluntary liquidation, compared to a restructuring 
exit.  
 
Secured debt level 
A high secured debt level generally indicates a large presence of securable assets (Scott, 
1976) with a high liquidation value. Only firms having assets with a high liquidation value or 
collateral value are able to contract secured loans. This is especially true for small privately 
owned firms, where bank finance is the main source of external finance and debt typically is 
heavily secured (Lean and Tucker, 2001). Assets appropriate for serving as collateral generally 
have a broader set of potential buyers and have a high value in alternative uses (i.e. high asset 
redeployability) and, hence, have a high liquidation value (Williamson 1988; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1992). A high liquidation value, in turn, impacts the probability of a successful 
liquidation in two ways. First, a high liquidation value increases the likelihood that liquidation 
value will exceed the current market value of stock, debt and legal obligations, which makes 
liquidation financially more attractive. If the firm’s assets can be sold at a high price, all 
stakeholders are likely to be compensated and even shareholders may receive a surplus, which 
positively influences the likelihood that managers will initiate a liquidation procedure. When 
managers’ intentions are strongly aligned with shareholder interests – for example, in privately 
held firms – a high liquidation value will increase the use of voluntary liquidation as a vehicle 
to transfer a distressed firm’s assets to higher valued uses and to generate positive returns for 
shareholders (Lang et al., 1995; Sullivan et al., 1997).  
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Second, in a situation of distress, a high liquidation value may cause secured creditors to 
push for liquidation instead of restructurings (Leyman et al., 2008). Well-secured creditors are 
more likely to oppose reorganization (Bergström et al., 2002) and push for liquidation (Ayotte 
and Morrison, 2008).  
Especially when collateral value equals or exceeds loan value, banks push for 
liquidation (Franks and Sussman, 2005), as liquidation then ensures that their loans will be fully 
repaid, while this is uncertain in a restructuring.  
As a result, indicating a higher liquidation value of the assets, a high secured debt level 
has a positive effect on the probability of a successful liquidation procedure and, hence, on the 
relative efficiency of voluntary liquidation compared to a restructuring exit.   
 
Debt level 
A low leverage positively affects the probability of a successful liquidation procedure 
(Fleming and Moon, 1995). Low debts increase the likelihood that the liquidation value of a 
firm’s assets is sufficient to compensate for the outstanding liabilities. A low debt level 
associated with a small number of creditors increases the success probability of a liquidation 
procedure even more (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996; Diamond, 2004). Moreover, when debts 
are low, shareholders are more likely to choose to liquidate if liquidation appears to maximize 
firm value. A low debt level increases the likelihood that shareholders will agree on a voluntary 
liquidation when the firm's liquidation value exceeds going-concern value (Ghosh et al., 1991). 
On the contrary, with a high debt level, the liquidation value of the assets is less likely to cover 
the outstanding liabilities and, in this kind of situation, creditors need to formally approve the 
liquidation procedure and the liquidation plan before the liquidation procedure can be initiated 
(Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle, 2008). Further, with a high debt level, shareholders are more 
likely to choose not to liquidate – even if liquidation would maximize firm value – because of 
the large agency costs related to the high debt level and because liquidation would increase the 
face value of a firm’s debt (Titman, 1984). For these reasons, in firms with a low leverage and a 
large equity buffer, the probability of a successful voluntary liquidation is larger. This is in line 
with the empirical studies on firm exit indicating a negative relationship between the level of 
debt and voluntary liquidation (Fleming and Moon, 1995; Kim and Schatzberg, 1987; Hite et 
al., 1987).  
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Second, a high level of debts has a positive effect on the probability of a successful 
restructuring exit for distressed firms (Kanatas and Qi, 2004), as it increases the probability of 
finding a suitable acquisition or merger partner. A high debt level acts as an enhancer of 
credibility that a distressed firm will be committed to continue production and competition if 
there is no merger (even if it reduces firm value), which increases the willingness of potential 
acquirer (industry rival) to consider a takeover of the distressed firm (Kanatas and Qi, 2004). 
Consequently, a high debt level debt helps the distressed firm to receive a better buyout price 
from a rival, even when it is unprofitable. Nevertheless, a too high debt level - indicating strong 
financial distress – might decrease the attractiveness of a firm as a takeover candidate (Pastena 
and Ruland 1986).  
As a result, having a negative effect on the probability of a successful liquidation 
procedure and a positive effect on the probability of a successful restructuring exit, a high 
leverage signifies a lower relative efficiency of voluntary liquidation, compared to a 
restructuring exit. This is in line with the studies of Clark and Ofek (1994), Astebro and Winter 
(2001), and Berger and Ofek (1996), who find a positive relationship between debt level and 
the probability of exit by an acquisition or merger. 
 
Cash holdings 
Cash holdings have a positive effect on the likelihood of a successful liquidation 
procedure (Ghosh et al., 1991; Fleming and Moon, 1995). Voluntary liquidation requires a full 
payment of all creditors. Here, large cash holdings increase the probability that the outstanding 
liabilities will be fully compensated and, hence, increase the attractiveness of liquidation.  
For this reason, large cash holdings indicate a higher relative efficiency of voluntary 
liquidation, as compared to an acquisition or merger. With large cash holdings, the relative 
efficiency of voluntary liquidation is higher. This corresponds to Ghosh et al. (1991) and 
Fleming and Moon (1995), who indicate a positive relationship between the liquidity level and 
the occurrence of voluntary liquidation.  
 
 22 
 
Firm performance  
A better firm performance – reflected in a higher profitability and/or a higher efficiency 
– negatively impacts the probability of a successful liquidation procedure (Leroy et al., 2009; 
Maksimovic and Philips, 2001), as it is associated with a higher going concern value. In better 
performing firms, liquidation causes more profit opportunities to be lost. Therefore, when 
performance is relatively high and the firm has reasonable prospects, voluntary liquidation 
becomes less efficient, while acquisition and merger become more attractive as exit alternatives 
(Kim and Schatzberg, 1987; Hite et al., 1987).   
Further, a better performance has a positive effect on the probability of a successful 
restructuring exit, because it positively influences the firm’s going concern value and the 
probability of finding a suitable partner for takeover. First, as better performing firms generally 
have a higher going concern value, they are more likely to be sold at a reasonable price. This 
makes an acquisition a more attractive exit option (Astebro and Winter, 2001). Second, a higher 
performance is likely to increase the probability of finding an acquisition partner. When a firm 
is more profitable, it is more likely to find a buyer who is willing to buy the firm at a correct 
price. Moreover, towards industry rivals, a high performance may act as an enhancer of 
credibility that the distressed firm will continue production if there is no acquisition, which may 
increase the willingness of industry rivals to consider a takeover of the distressed firm and 
negotiate a reasonable price for the firm (Kanatas and Qi, 2004).  
Consequently, as a result of its negative effect on the probability of a successful 
liquidation procedure and positive effect on the probability of a successful restructuring exit, a 
high performance indicates a lower relative efficiency of voluntary liquidation, compared to a 
restructuring exit. 
Besides the determinants considered in this study, other factors may impact the relative 
efficiency of voluntary liquidation compared to a restructuring exit. For example, future growth 
opportunities (Erwin and McConnel, 1997; Ghosh et al., 1991), asset composition, degree of 
inside ownership (Ghosh et al., 1991; Fleming and Moon, 1995) and hostile takeover pressure 
(Fleming and Moon, 1995) may affect the probability of a successful liquidation procedure 
and/or the probability of a successful restructuring exit. Further, the market power of the 
distressed firm, the opportunities for economies of scale and scope, the opportunities for 
knowledge transfer and learning, and the transaction cost efficiency may impact the probability 
of a successful acquisition or merger. However, due to data availability restrictions, these 
factors are not included as indicators of the relative efficiency of voluntary liquidation.  
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4. RESEARCH METHOD 
 
This study on the determinants of the exit type after economic distress is conducted 
using an extensive sample of distress-related firm exits employing a nested logit methodology. 
 
4.1. Sample of distress-related exits 
This study on exit-type determinants is based on a large Belgian sample of 6,118 
distress-related exits of mature firms. The sample of distress-related exits is based on a 
comprehensive dataset of all exits in the period 1998–20002 and is provided by the National 
Bank of Belgium (NBB). For each Belgian firm and on a yearly basis, the NBB 
‘Balanscentrale’ registers the annual account and all juridical information3. From this dataset of 
exits, new or starting-phase firms less than five years old at the time of exit are excluded. Sole 
proprietorships, not-for-profit firms, public organizations and companies with a social aim, and 
firms with a special main business activity—firms providing financial intermediation and 
insurance, portfolio companies and management activities of holdings, extra-territorial 
organizations, real estate firms and enterprises with activities located only in a foreign 
country—are also  excluded. These types of firms have a specific nature and are likely to have 
specific exit paths, with distinct determinants. It is obvious that we could not apply insights on 
the exit-type determinants of these firms generally to all other firms.  
Signs of distress precede all exits in the sample. The first sign of distress is viewed as 
the starting point of the exit path. In the literature, there is yet no consensus on the most 
appropriate distress criterion. Possible indicators of financial distress include several years of 
negative net operating income, bottom-line and accumulated losses, negative working capital, 
retained earnings deficits, share sales to private investors, capital restructuring or 
reorganization, negative shareholder’s funds, suspension of dividend payments, and major 
restructurings or layoffs (McKeown et al., 1991; McLeay and Omar, 2000; Platt and Platt, 
2002; Rosner, 2003). In this study, a sign of distress is defined as an annual account with 
negative recurring profit after taxes, that is, when operating revenues are insufficient to cover 
(1) operating expenses, such as the expenses for goods and services needed for production 
(commodities, accessories, raw materials and services), the costs of personnel, write-offs and 
depreciations of fixed assets (land, plant and equipment, and licenses) and depreciation of 
inventories, orders in progress and accounts receivable; (2) the financial costs of debt; and (3) 
taxes.  
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Government subsidies, such as turnover subsidies and interest subsidies, are not taken 
into account. Table A.1 in the Appendix provides details on the calculation of recurring profit 
after taxes. In contrast to net profit after taxes, recurring profit after taxes does not consider 
extraordinary results (i.e., exceptional revenues and expenses), financial revenues and financial 
expenses other than expenses related to debt4. It has an operational content because it reflects 
the excess of revenues over expenses derived from normal business activities. As the 
exceptional revenues and expenses are not included in the calculation of recurring profit, this 
indicator of distress is also less influenced by earnings management practices. Because of its 
close relatedness to the concept of ‘economic added result’ (Van Caillie and Dighaye, 2002) 
and ‘revenue productivity’ (Becchetti and Sierra, 2002), the recurring profit criterion can be 
seen as a mirror of firm efficiency and firm success. This soft definition of distress allows for 
the study of a broad spectrum of distress-related exits, including ‘impulsive firm’ exits as an 
outcome of an excessive fast-growth strategy5 (Argenti, 1976). The sample excludes rapid, 
unexpected exits, which have little to do with a situation of distress. For example, “sudden 
bankruptcies” reflecting a strategic decision, where it is very likely that the firms have 
idiosyncratic reasons for the bankruptcy filing, which are not related to financial distress and 
are likely to be driven by strategic issues or even management fraud (Hill et al., 1996) are 
excluded, as well as “accidental bankruptcies”, resulting from an unexpected event, such as a 
natural disaster (Davis and Huang, 2004). 
This large dataset of distress-related exits is unique and offers considerable value-added 
to the existing literature on firm exit and business failure. First, as it concerns a complete 
sample, it minimizes possible selection biases. Second, it contains a large number of small and 
medium-sized privately owned enterprises (SMEs). These have been largely neglected in 
previous empirical work on exit paths and business failure, where the vast majority of research 
has dealt with large listed firms because of data availability issues and publicity around large 
firm failures. However, SMEs have been one of the major driving forces of worldwide 
economic growth, employment and prosperity during the last few decades. At the same time, 
during the past decade, many European (privately owned) SMEs are threatened by increased 
competition and the number of SME exiting because of distress is substantial. As it appears 
essential to gain insights into the exit-path dynamics in SMEs, the strong presence of privately 
owned SMEs in our dataset is of great importance. A third important feature of the dataset is its 
focus on established and more mature firms. During the past decade, an increasing number of 
failures of mature, nonstarting firms in most European countries have been observed.  
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Although firm exit previously mostly happened to new firms, the fierce competitive 
situation has created eliminations from more established firms. Nevertheless, numerous firm 
exit studies have focused on the investigation of new firms and largely ignored the exit path of 
more mature firms. This study will only analyze firms that have survived the first five years 
following their foundation. New firms, which generally have a distinct principal goal (Thornhill 
and Amit, 2003) and a specific kind of exit path, in which personal characteristics of the 
owner/manager play a major role and in which there is no gradual evolution toward exit 
(Pompe and Bilderbeek, 2005), are excluded from the analysis. 
Table 1 shows the composition of the sample of distress-related exits concerning the 
specific legal procedure. The sample contains 2,533 cases of involuntary exit (41.4%), 2,700 
cases of voluntary liquidation (44.13%) and 885 restructuring exits (14.47%). The involuntary 
exits mainly involve cases of bankruptcy but also a few cases of judicial winding-up and 
compulsory liquidation. In addition, we also consider firms operating under a juridical 
reorganization procedure known as a ‘moratorium on payments’6, where firms have (1) stopped 
depositing annual accounts for a period of at least two years after filing for a reorganization 
procedure (indicating the total disappearance of the firm) or (2) where their restructuring plan 
has not been successfully completed, involving a ‘recall’ of the moratorium on payments. The 
2,700 cases of voluntary liquidation include cases filed at the Court of Commerce as an ‘early 
dissolution/liquidation’ (indicating that the liquidation procedure is being executed) or ‘closure 
of liquidation’ (indicating that the liquidation procedure is completely terminated). Finally, the 
885 restructuring exits mainly include acquisitions, but there are also a few mergers and splits. 
Of the distress-related exits in our sample, 47.29% are in the trade industry, including 
wholesale, retail, and hotel, restaurant and catering activities, 31.64% involve manufacturing 
firms with activities in manufacturing, agriculture or construction, and 21.07% are in the 
service industry, including personal, business and transport services. Except for five listed 
firms, all exits in our sample concern privately owned firms. It should be stressed that because 
of the limitation of the preexit window up to fiscal year 1990, the maximum duration of the exit 
paths in our sample is 11 years. The mean (median) exit-path length is 6.21 years (6.59 years). 
A firm enters our dataset at time t = 1 as the year where the firm experiences distress for the 
first time or the starting point of the exit path. The firm is then observed annually until it finally 
exits. The last observation is the observation at the time of exit (i.e., between t=1 and t =11). 
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Insert Table 1 About Here 
The survival curves in figure 1 reflect the distribution of the exit-path length since the 
first sign of distress for all exits of a given type that occur within 11 years of the first sign of 
distress. The survival curves in figure 1 are based on the survival rates for each exit alternative 
or the percentage of firms that exit after time unit t conditional on having survived up to time t, 
starting with 100% (all firms enter the dataset) and ending with 0% (all firms have exited and 
left the dataset after t = 11). First, we find that early exits happen more frequently in the form of 
a voluntary liquidation or a restructuring exit and less frequently in the form of an involuntary 
exit. Overall, restructuring exits are associated with longer exit paths, and this is confirmed with 
statistical testing. A Kruskal–Wallis test (p = 0.001) indicates that the distribution of the exit 
timing in the subsamples of involuntary exits, voluntary liquidations and restructuring exits 
differs. Subsequently, nonparametric Mann–Whitney tests show that the restructuring exits are 
preceded by significantly longer exit paths when compared to the involuntary exits and 
voluntary liquidations (p = 0.000 compared to involuntary exits and p = 0.003 compared to 
voluntary liquidations). 
 
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
4.2. Method of analysis 
We employ a binomial nested logit (NL) model to analyze the data (Jones and Hensher, 
2007). In the context of this study, the NL approach offers a considerable advantage over 
standard multinomial logistic regression (MLR). One motivation for using a NL method is that 
the one-stage design of MLR may not reflect reality. A two-stage or ‘nested’ design is more 
appropriate for the exit setting with a clear distinction between involuntary and voluntary exits. 
We apply a two-stage nested logit model with two well-separated nests corresponding to the 
voluntary or involuntary nature of the exit type. In the first step, involuntary exit is considered 
as the alternative to voluntary exit and, in the second step, provided that the exit is of a 
voluntary nature, voluntary liquidation is seen as the exit alternative to a restructuring exit. A 
second motivation for a NL model is that it partially relaxes the IID and IIA assumptions of 
MLR7. Through partitioning or ‘nesting’, any potential differences in the sources of unobserved 
heterogeneity can be investigated.  
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NL also recognizes the existence of different variances across exit alternatives and 
correlation among certain subsets of exit types. Figure 2 shows the two-stage nested tree 
structure used in this study. The two voluntary exit alternatives—voluntary liquidation and 
restructuring exit— are assumed to be linked to each other through a composite exit alternative 
called ‘voluntary exit’. The top level of the tree (Level 2) involves the distinction between 
involuntary exit and voluntary exit, while the bottom level (Level 1) involves the choice 
between voluntary liquidation and restructuring exit. The link between the two voluntary exit 
types – the level of correlation in the unobserved influences – is reflected in the inclusive value 
(IV) index of the composite exit alternative and is used as an additional explanatory variable in 
the NL model.  
 
Insert Figure 2 About Here 
The NL model consists of two binary logistic models. The binary logistic model for 
Level 2 of the tree structure models the log-odds of voluntary exit relative to involuntary exit, 
while the model corresponding to Level 1 models the log-odds of voluntary liquidation relative 
to restructuring exit, conditional on voluntary exit. Both binary logistic models predict the exit 
type (conditional on the fact that the firm exits) by means of distinct explanatory and control 
variables and are stratified by exit-path length8. The binary logistic model for Level 1 is given 
by: 
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where αt is the intercept for exit after path length t; xi is variable i (with i = 1,2,…,n) and 
βi is the coefficient for variable xi. Based on the conditional probabilities, the inclusive value is 
calculated as:  
 
IV = log (exp (αt+βx)+1)          (2) 
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where αt is the intercept for exit after path length t; x is the vector of n variables xi and β 
is the vector of n coefficients . The parameter estimate of the IV index can be seen as the 
statistical test for the relevance of the interdependency. If the IV index is not significant, no 
nested specification is needed and standard MLR could suffice. The second binary logistic 
model for Level 2, which takes into account the inclusive value IV calculated from the first 
binary logistic model, is: 
 
 
nnt xxxIV
exityinvoluntarP
exitvoluntaryP
22221211)(
)(ln γγγγµ +++++=





K
 (3) 
 
where µt is the intercept for exit after path length t; IV is the inclusive value; γ1 is the 
coefficient for inclusive value IV; xi is variable i (with i = 1,2,…,n) and γ2i is the coefficient for 
variable xi.  
 
4.3. Variables 
All explanatory and control variables are measured at the first sign of distress—the 
starting point of the exit path—and at the time of exit. The explanatory variables or indicators 
of the available and potential slack resources and the relative efficiency of voluntary 
liquidation, as compared to a restructuring exit are: cash holdings, strength of group relations, 
leverage, business group membership, firm size, secured debt level, and performance. The level 
of cash holdings (CASH) is measured by the amount of cash and cash equivalents divided by 
total assets. Cash equivalents include marketable securities and bank balances on current 
accounts. The strength of group relations (GROUP) is measured by the level of financial 
interactions with related firms and firms with holding interests as a percentage of total assets. 
These interactions involve (1) investments in participations and in claims (i.e. financial fixed 
assets), (2) claims, (3) monetary deposits and (4) debts. It is important to note that the group 
relations are not restricted to parent-subsidiary relations, but also involve financial interactions 
with other subsidiaries from the same group and with companies in which the firm holds equity 
participations. In the context of this study, where the majority of firms are small, financial 
interactions with related firms may be an important source of slack. Leverage (LEVERAGE) is 
measured by the ratio of the book value of both long-term and short-term debts on total assets. 
Business group membership is reflected by a dummy variable D_NOGROUP, which takes a 
value of one if group relations are absent and zero otherwise.  
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We use this dummy variable reflecting absence of business group membership, to avoid 
multicollineaity with the continuous variable GROUP. Also, the simultaneous inclusion of both 
the variable GROUP and the dummy variable D_NOGROUP in our models allows to eliminate 
biases driven by a strong presence of firms with no group relations, as more than 75% of the 
firms have no group relations. In addition, Firm size (SIZE) is measured by the natural log of 
the book value of total assets (in 1.000 €), which is a common size proxy. The log transformed 
variable is used because it is reasonable to assume that the marginal effect of size is stronger for 
small firms. The secured debt level (SECURED) is measured by the percentage of total debts 
that are guaranteed by business securities on the firm’s assets. Firm performance is observed 
through productivity or efficiency and profitability. Productivity (PRODUCTIVITY) is 
measured by the ratio of gross value added to total assets, while profitability 
(PROFITABILITY) is measured by EBIT on total assets9. 
Next to the indicators of slack resources and relative efficiency of liquidation, following 
control variables are included: firm age, absence of secured debts, and industry type. Firm age 
(AGE) is a variable that has appeared in many studies as an important predictor of business 
failure. Further, as more mature firms generally (1) are more efficient and more competent 
(Levinthal, 1991) as a result of learning effects, decreasing production costs, accumulation of 
skills and knowledge, more developed production technologies, and reputation building, (2) 
have more stable social relations (Stinchcombe, 1965) and (3) have more experience 
concerning the most appropriate size and composition of organizational slack (Sharfman et al., 
1988)10, we expect firm age to affect the probability of successful bankruptcy avoidance. Also, 
firm age may impact the probability of a takeover or merger. As older firms generally have a 
higher level of accurate publicly available firm information and, hence, a lower level of 
information asymmetry towards outsiders (Pagano et al., 1998), they may be better able to find 
an acquirer or merger partner. Moreover, firm age may affect the probability of liquidation 
through a correlation with the age of the firm’s owner. In firms with an owner approaching 
retirement age, the probability of liquidation may be higher (Prantl, 2003). Firm age is 
measured as the number of years of operational activity. We further include a dummy variable 
reflecting absence of secured debts (D_NOSECURED). This dummy variable takes the value of 
one where debts are totally unsecured and zero otherwise. D_NOSECURED is introduced 
simultaneously with the variable SECURED, because of the high frequency (more than 75%) of 
zero observations for the level of secured debt. Also, it allows to separately asses the impact of 
having no secured debts or no secured creditors on the exit type. Further, the industry type may 
also influence the eventual exit type of a distress
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For example, according to organization theory, the amount and type of slack that is 
stored inside a firm may be determined by the industry in which the firm operates11 (Sharfman 
et al., 1988). Further, the industry may influence the relative efficiency of voluntary liquidation 
and restructuring exit. As industry type determines asset liquidity (Schlingemann et al., 2002; 
Praet, 2008), it may, in turn, influence the relative efficiency of both voluntary exit systems. 
Second, through the evolution of industry demand, the industry type may impact the efficiency 
of voluntary liquidation versus acquisition: a declining industry demand is likely to increase the 
efficiency of liquidation. For these reasons, industry dummies are included as control variables. 
We distinguish three main industry types: manufacturing (i.e., manufacturing, agriculture and 
construction), trade (i.e., wholesale, retail and hotel, restaurant and catering activities) and 
services (i.e., personal, business and transport services). We use a binary variable D_TRADE 
that takes a value of one if the exit concerns a trade firm and a binary variable 
D_MANUFACTURING that takes a value of one if the exit considers a manufacturing 
company. Finally, the exit timing or exit-path length (t) is considered as a factor that may 
influence the results. For each exit case, we record the time since the first sign of distress (t), 
which has a value between 1 and 11 by design. The inclusion of interactions between the exit 
timing and the various firm characteristics allows us to assess whether the effect of a particular 
factor on the occurrence of a certain exit type differs between long and short exit paths. 
It should be noted that, although the environmental conditions underlying the situation 
of distress (for example, a declining demand, strong competitive entry) and the primary factors 
driving distress (for example, managerial incompetence, changes in technology or consumer 
tastes, or competitive actions) may affect firm strategy and the type of exit that is chosen, we 
have no information on these environmental variables. As a result, we are unable to control for 
these effects. Additionally, we are unable to control for a possible effect of information 
asymmetry and poor monitoring on the exit type, because we lack information on information 
asymmetries (for example, R&D investment, degree of analyst coverage and disclosure) and the 
degree of monitoring (for example, number of outside block holders, number of insiders in the 
board of directors and the level of stock held by blockholders). 
The main sources of information for the explanatory variables are the annual accounts 
of the firms. Variables are measured at the first signs of distress and in the exit year12. Exit-year 
observations involving accounts that closed after the legal exit are removed from the analysis 
because these observations are likely distorted by transactions in the context of the (impending) 
exit procedure. We substitute missing and removed exit-year observations with observations 
from the preceding year (i.e., prior to the exit year).  
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This assumes the previous year’s annual accounts accurately reflect the financial 
situation of the firm at the time of exit. After replacement, 2,137 exit-year observations 
(34.93%) remain missing.  
 
4.4. Sample description 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables measured at the first 
sign of distress or at the start of the exit path (i.e., time t = 1), including the control variables 
firm age, exit timing, absence of secured debts and the binary variables reflecting industry 
type13. The table compares voluntary and involuntary exits, and voluntary liquidations and 
restructuring exits. A variance analysis for the three exit types, including one-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) and Welch tests, indicate that most firm characteristics differ significantly 
across the exit types, except for the variables measuring performance. Mann-Whithey U-tests 
and t-tests are used to compare voluntary exits to involuntary exits, and voluntary liquidations 
to restructuring exits. Compared to firms with a voluntary exit, companies with an involuntary 
exit have lower cash holdings, fewer group relations, a higher current leverage, a smaller firm 
size and a higher secured debt level and they are younger at the first sign of distress. Voluntary 
liquidations, as compared to restructuring exits, are associated with larger cash holdings, 
weaker group relations, a smaller firm size, a lower profitability and a shorter exit path. Finally, 
Chi-square tests for the subsamples of involuntary and voluntary exits and for voluntary 
liquidations and restructuring exits, point out that a higher percentage of firms with involuntary 
exits have no group relations, while the restructuring exits includes a higher percentage group 
firms. Further, in the subgroup of involuntary exits, relatively fewer firms have no secured 
debts. Finally, the subsample of involuntary exits includes more trade firms and manufacturing 
companies and the subsample of restructuring exits includes fewer trade firms. There are no 
indications of multicollinearity among the independent variables: the bivariate correlations are 
low with a maximum correlation coefficient of 0.428 for firm size and group relations, 
measured at the time of exit. 
 
Insert Table 2 About Here 
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5. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
The first binary logistic model estimates the probability of voluntary exit compared to 
involuntary exit. We introduce the variables cash holdings (CASH), strength of group relations 
(GROUP) and current leverage (LEVERAGE) as explanatory variables and we consider all 
other variables – the explanatory variables indicating the relative efficiency of voluntary 
liquidation and the control variables – as control variables. The inclusion of the interactions 
between the exit timing (t) and the explanatory and control variables as additional variables is 
done by backwards stepwise analysis. Only the significant interactions—indicating that the 
effect of a particular variable on the occurrence of a certain exit type significantly changes over 
the exit-path length—are maintained in the model. No other interactions are allowed. The 
second binary logistic model, modeling the probability of voluntary liquidation as compared to 
restructuring exit, is developed in a similar way. This model includes business group 
membership (D_NOGROUP), firm size (SIZE), secured debt level (SECURED), leverage 
(LEVERAGE), cash holdings (CASH) and performance (PRODUCTIVITY and 
PROFITABILITY) as explanatory variables and all other variables as control variables. The IV 
index is significantly different from 1.0 for all models. As a result, the IIA assumption does not 
hold. This statistically justifies the choice for the NL method against the MLR approach. 
 
5.1. Voluntary exit versus involuntary exit 
The results of the binary logistic model for Level 2 of the NL model are reported in 
Table 3. We report the analysis of two different models. In the first model, the firm variables 
are measured at the first sign of distress (i.e., t = 1), while in the second model, the firm 
variables are measured at the time of exit. The first model (N = 6,057), using firm variables 
measured at the first sign of distress, correctly classifies 65.22% of the observations. The 
performance of the second model (N = 3,922) is even higher, correctly classifying 79.92% of 
observations. For each model, Table 3 reports the beta coefficients of the variables, the odds 
ratios (i.e., exponentiated values of the beta coefficients), the standard errors and the p-values or 
significance levels.  
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Insert Table 3 About Here 
In line with Hypothesis 1, firms with larger cash holdings have a higher probability of 
a voluntary exit and a lower probability of an involuntary exit. This provides evidence that 
high available slack resources, both at the first sign of distress and at exit, reduce the 
probability of an involuntary exit. In addition, as suggested in Hypothesis 2, firms with strong 
group relations are more likely to avoid involuntary exit and opt for a voluntary exit. These 
firms have easy access to additional slack resources or a high level of potential slack 
resources. In addition, high leverage, indicating lower potential slack, decreases the 
probability of a voluntary exit. As a result, this study provides evidence that a high potential 
slack decreases the probability of involuntary exit. It should be noted that current leverage 
only determines the exit type when observed at the start of the exit path. Accordingly, when 
experiencing distress for the first time, a low level of debt contributes to the successful 
avoidance of involuntary exit. Potential slack should be mobilized quickly, however, as it 
does not shield a firm against bankruptcy at the time of exit. Logically, creditors are not 
inclined to provide additional credit when exit is near.  
Further, several control factors significantly impact whether a distressed firm is able 
to voluntarily exit or whether the firm is forced into bankruptcy. First, absence of business 
group membership is found to have a negative effect on the likelihood of a voluntary exit 
relative to an involuntary exit. This provides evidence that stand-alone firms, as compared to 
group firms, are more likely to exit involuntarily. Alternatively, business group membership 
appears to stimulate successful bankruptcy avoidance. In addition, older firms and firms 
without secured debts have a higher probability of a voluntary exit and a lower probability of 
an involuntary exit, consistent with earlier studies. Older firms have more capabilities to 
avoid involuntary exit. The effect of secured debts might be explained by the fact that secured 
creditors may force managers of distressed firms to file for an involuntary exit, because of 
their secured position (Leyman and Schoors, 2008). When a distressed firm has no secured 
creditors, there is less outside pressure to file for bankruptcy. Firm size, profitability and 
industry type do not allow to distinguish between involuntary and voluntary exits.  
Finally, based on the interaction effects, the exit timing is found to influence the 
eventual exit type of a distressed firm.  
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In particular, in the case of early exit, the effects of available and potential slack on 
the exit type are more pronounced: the positive effect of cash holdings and the negative effect 
of leverage on the probability of voluntary exit is stronger. This provides evidence of early 
involuntary exits driven by low slack resources. 
 
5.2. Voluntary liquidations versus restructuring exits 
Table 4 reports the results of the binary logistic model for Level 1 of the NL model. 
The firm variables are again measured at the first sign of distress and at the time of exit. The 
percentage correctly classified by this model is 77.09% when using observations at the first 
sign of distress (N = 3,526) and 82.7% when using observations at the time of exit (N = 
3,103).  
The results support hypotheses 3 in several ways. First, independent firms are more 
likely than group firms to liquidate rather than to restructure, as expected. Further, a larger 
firm size, indicating a lower relative efficiency of voluntary liquidation, decreases the 
probability of liquidation and increases the likelihood of a restructuring exit. Finally, a higher 
secured debt level and larger cash holdings increase the probability of voluntary liquidation. 
Consequently, the results offer strong support to hypothesis 3 concerning the positive effect 
of the relative efficiency of voluntary liquidation on the probability of voluntary liquidation, 
as an alternative to a restructuring exit.  
 
Insert Table 4 About Here 
Based on the arguments concerning the relative efficiency of the exit systems, a 
negative effect of leverage on voluntary liquidation is expected. The results show, however, 
that a high leverage at the time of exit increases the probability of voluntary liquidation, while 
leverage at the first sign of distress does not impact the exit type. This can be explained by the 
fact that, when firms approach exit, the advanced stage of deterioration of financial health is 
likely to involve exceedingly high debt levels, which in turn may cause difficulties in finding 
a suitable takeover or merger partner. A very high leverage of a target firm may cause the 
leverage of the combined firm to be much higher than the original firm, which may 
significantly decrease the (future) borrowing capacity of the combined firm.  
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As a result, firms with very high debt levels are less attractive takeover targets and 
less advantageous merger partners (Pastena and Ruland, 1986; Palepu, 1986; Dietrich and 
Sorensen, 1984).  
In addition, a high leverage at the time of exit may cause the creditors to oppose to a 
transfer of property associated with acquisition or merger.  
Absence of secured debts and industry type further influence the voluntary exit type. 
Although a high level of secured debt stimulates voluntary liquidation, having no secured 
debt also appears to drive voluntary liquidation. These findings suggest that firms without 
secured debt do not necessarily have a low liquidation value. The role of secured debt hence 
warrants further research. The positive effect of trade activities on voluntary liquidation may 
result from wholesale and retail firms being less desirable candidates for acquisition by 
healthy industry rivals (Jensen, 1988; Burt and Limmack, 2001). As the interest in mergers 
and takeovers in retailing is mainly based on the potential impact on market concentration 
and market power, the potential benefits to be gained from a merger or acquisition of a 
distressed retail company, suffering from insufficient demand for its products, are relatively 
low (Burt and Limmack, 2001). Firm age and strength of group relations do not affect the 
type of voluntary exit. Finally, there is one significant interaction effect, namely between exit 
timing and group relations. The positive effect of the strength of group relations on 
liquidation is stronger when exit is delayed. This might indicate that groups first try to 
restructure subsidiaries and only liquidate them when that proves to be impossible. 
 
5.3. Sensitivity analysis 
As a sensitivity analysis, the results of the two-level NL model are compared to the 
MLR model (given in Table A.2 in the Appendix), where voluntary liquidations and 
restructuring exits are simultaneously compared to involuntary exits, which are regarded as 
the ‘base exit alternative’. The main conclusions from the MLR model are in line with the 
conclusions from the NL model. That is, the probability of an involuntary exit is higher for 
firms with a low level of available and potential slack resources: firms with small cash 
holdings, weak group relations and high leverage. Further, the results of the MLR model 
show that when compared to an involuntary exit, the likelihood of a voluntary liquidation is 
higher for small firms, while large firms are more likely to exit by a restructuring exit. 
Furthermore, additional NL models are estimated including two additional control factors.  
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A first factor reflects employee representation in the form of works council, which is 
compulsory for larger Belgian firms with at least a hundred employees. As the employee 
representatives may steer upon an exit type that is most favorable for the employees and try to 
avoid exit types that may put them at a disadvantage, we may expect that the presence of a 
works council affects the eventual exit type. Further, we take into account a possible effect of 
the replacement of missing exit observations by the preceding observation by including a 
binary variable that takes a value of one where missing exit observations are replaced. The 
extended NL models do not alter the conclusions, hinting that the results are robust.  
 
5.4. Overview of exit-type determinants 
Figure 3 presents an overview of the most significant determinants of exit type. The 
determinants of which the effects are in line with the hypotheses concerning available and 
potential slack resources (Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2) and regarding the relative 
efficiency of voluntary liquidation as an exit system (Hypothesis 3) are presented within the 
frame. 
 
Insert Figure 3 About Here 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This study provides new insights on the determinants of distress-related involuntary 
and voluntary exits preceded by at least one year of economic distress. A two-stage nested 
logit model considering various firm characteristics measured at the start of the exit path—
when the first sign of distress is noticed—and at the time of exit indicates the determinants of 
exit type. Based on a unique sample of 6,118 distress-related firm exits in Belgium, we first 
show that it is important to consider the exit outcome of a distressed firm as a two-stage 
process. In a first stage, there is a fundamental distinction between voluntary exits, being a 
voluntary liquidation or a restructuring exit by acquisition, merger or split, and involuntary 
exits as the most unfavorable exit alternative. In this stage, firms usually try to avoid 
involuntary exit, as it is the least favorable option for most stakeholders. In a second stage, 
and provided that the exit is of a voluntary nature, voluntary liquidation is considered as an 
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alternative to a restructuring exit (mainly acquisition). Here, a firm can voluntarily decide 
about the desired exit mode, being a voluntary liquidation or a restructuring exit in the form 
of an acquisition, merger or split.  
This study shows that distressed firms with a higher level of available and potential 
slack resources are more likely to avoid an involuntary exit and have a higher probability of a 
voluntary exit. As firms with a lot of cash and a strong solvency position obviously cannot 
exit through bankruptcy – the judicial prescriptions concerning bankruptcy filing involve 
recurring poor liquidity and solvency– this finding may not seem surprising. However, for 
firms with low cash holdings and a high debt level, bankruptcy is not the only exit as an 
outcome of distress. Firms can as well exit by voluntary liquidation, by an acquisition by 
another firm or by a merger. In this respect, this study finds large-scale empirical evidence 
that, with distress, firms with a lower level of available organizational slack as reflected by 
small cash holdings, are less likely to avoid bankruptcy and are less likely to decide on their 
exit process. Further, firms with a lower level of potential slack resources, as indicated by 
weak group relations and smaller future borrowing capacity—a high current leverage—are 
more likely to experience a bankruptcy, whereas a higher level of potential slack drives 
voluntary exit. Our findings are consistent with Sharfman et al. (1988), Bromily (1991), 
Cheng and Kesner (1997), Tan and Peng (2003), and earlier studies of Cyert and March 
(1963), Thompson (1967) and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), who maintain that, in a situation 
of distress, slack resources act as a buffer. In line with organization theory, this study 
reinforces the importance of both available and potential slack resources in the avoidance of 
involuntary exit. Although organizational slack is sometimes claimed to have adverse effects 
on firm efficiency, slack resources appear to be important in a context of financial distress, 
because they may allow offsetting an impending bankruptcy. Furthermore, the current 
findings indicate that increasing leverage with a view to increase cash and buy back shares so 
as to eventually enhance the probability of being acquired by another firm may be a risky 
strategy. In fact, this behaviour may strongly increase the risk of involuntary bankruptcy and, 
hence, eliminate the possibility to opt for a more favourable, voluntary exit.  
Further, this study provides evidence that, given that a firm voluntarily exits and 
considers voluntary liquidation as the alternative to a restructuring exit, the relative efficiency 
of both exit options will determine the type of voluntary exit. A high relative efficiency of 
voluntary liquidation compared to restructuring exit increases the probability of voluntary 
liquidation and reduces the chances of a restructuring exit. The finding that an absence of 
group relations, small firm size, a high secured debt level and large cash holdings contribute 
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to voluntary liquidation is consistent with strategy literature, suggesting that efficiency-
related aspects – such as the liquidation value and the probability of a successful liquidation 
procedure – will determine the motivation of the owner(s) to liquidate a distressed firm 
(Caves and Porter, 1976; Porter, 1976; Gimeno et al., 1997). On the contrary, the firm will 
exit by a restructuring exit, when the relative efficiency of acquisition or merger as a possible 
exit alternative is higher.  
 
Limitations 
While insightful, our findings suffer from a number of limitations. First, as result of 
the research design, which includes observation at the first sign of distress and at the time of 
exit, this study provides no further insights into the way in which slack resources are 
managed over the course of the exit path and their dynamic role in determining exit type. 
Therefore, future studies should examine how firms manage their slack resources after a first 
sign of distress, over the whole exit path. Second, we narrowed our study to exits over the 
1998-2000 period and, as a consequence, the generalizability of our findings may be limited. 
It may be beneficial for future researchers to include exit data from other years and from a 
more recent period, including the recessionary period starting from 2008. Third, we relied 
solely on available slack and potential financial slack to examine the effect of slack resources 
on the exit type. Low-discretion slack resources or absorbed slack resources, such as excess 
machine capacity, inventories of finished goods, work in progress, accounts payable and 
accounts receivable, are not investigated, although they may be important dimensions of 
organizational slack (Bourgeois and Singh, 1983; Sharfman et al., 1988; Bromiley, 1991).  
Furthermore, we do not compare distress-related exits to distressed firms that survive, 
with only distress-related exits and their exit type investigated. While one could argue that 
our study has a limited contribution for this reason, we claim there are benefits to be gained 
from the in-depth study of distress-related exits. The most important benefit is that a detailed 
analysis of distress-related exits, including the careful analysis of firms that are unable to 
avoid bankruptcy, allows for learning from firms that have made mistakes and exit with a 
less-than-efficient exit outcome. This contributes in turn to increasing our understanding of 
the eventual success of firms that learn from the experiences and mistakes of others and may 
even allow the development of better models of value creation (McGrath, 1999). 
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Future research 
We hope that our efforts in investigating the effect of slack resources in the context of 
distress-related exit encourage other researchers to further explore the means by which 
managers can avoid involuntary exit and, instead aim at a voluntary type of exit. Besides 
slack resources, which are the focal point of discussion in this study, other activities can help 
managers avoiding involuntary exit in a situation of distress. Given the recent recessionary 
situation in the global economy, we believe that additional investigations concerning tools to 
avoid involuntary exit are necessary. Further, future empirical research on distress-related exit 
could be focused on the identification of a number of common exit paths leading to 
involuntary exit, voluntary liquidation and restructuring exit, based on sequences of events 
concerning the exit-type determinants revealed in this study. Future research could also be 
devoted to the initial phase of distress-related failure paths: that is, the period preceding the 
first sign of distress. This would involve the identification of the causes of distress. 
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NOTES  
 
1   In contrast to organization theory, agency theory suggests that financial slack has adverse 
consequences s for a firm, as it may result in agency problems (increased inefficiencies, 
decreased risk-taking and lower performance) in the absence of sufficient monitoring or 
governance devices (Fama, 1980; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In the context of this study 
on distress-related firm exit, we suggest that the basics of agency theory may not be 
perfectly suited to explain firm behavior. As distressed firms try to survive, the reasoning 
underlying organization theory appears to provide a better rationale. This is in line with 
Daniel et al. (2004), who also suggest that slack resources should be considered in the 
context of a resource-based view and the behavioral theory of the firm. Moreover, as our 
study mainly concerns privately owned firms in which ownership and control is no 
separated, agency-related resource conflicts are not present. 
2  This particular three-year exit period is chosen because: (1) we do not want to limit our 
study to one particular year; (2) we aim to study as many preexit years as possible, taking 
into account that we can only find reliable, systematic annual account information for fiscal 
years after 1989; and (3) we are able to check the evolution of juridical situations in the 
postexit period. 
3  In Belgium, all firms, even small companies, deposit their annual accounts with the NBB in 
a standardized format, including balance sheets, profit-and-loss accounts and additional 
disclosures. These annual accounts in a complete (for large firms) or abbreviated (for small 
firms) form yields very detailed information on the firm’s financial situation. 
4  Contrary to a negative recurring profit after taxes, which is a sign of real distress, a net loss 
does not necessarily point to real distress. A net loss could simply be the result of low 
financial revenues (for example, low revenues from participation in other firms), high 
financial expenses (for example, large depreciations of deposits and cash equivalents), low 
extraordinary revenues and/or high extraordinary expenses (for example, exceptional write-
offs or losses from the disposal of assets or business segments). Moreover, firms often 
report negative extraordinary results so as to decrease net profit in an attempt to avoid 
taxes. 
5  Analyses have shown that most firms in our sample, once having experienced a negative 
recurring result, also have negative recurring results in subsequent years. 
6  Similar to reorganization procedures in other countries—‘Chapter 11’ in the U.S., 
‘administrative receivership’ in the U.K., ‘collective procedure’ in France (Kaiser, 1996; 
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Couwenberg, 2001)—the Belgian procedure of moratorium on payments permits a firm 
with (impending) payment problems to take legal shelter from its creditors for a certain 
period during which it can implement a reorganization plan. It is important to note that 
although the basic intention of the Belgian reorganization procedure is to help firms 
recover from a situation of distress, it is strongly oriented toward bankruptcy. It is rarely 
used, but is usually unsuccessful and followed by bankruptcy (Research Reports of 
Graydon NV). As outsiders and employees generally interpret a filing as a signal of a 
forthcoming bankruptcy, only firms with serious problems with payments and continuing 
operations will file for a moratorium on payments. We note the similarly low popularity 
and success rate of reorganization procedures in many other European countries 
(Couwenberg, 2001). 
7  The IID assumption implies independent and identically distributed error structures, and 
the IIA assumption implies independence of irrelative alternatives (i.e. the ratio of the 
probabilities of two exit alternatives is independent of the presence of the other exit 
alternative) (Train, 2003). 
8  Stratification involves the inclusion of an intercept for each exit-path duration t (i.e., 
between 1 and 11). As a result, the models predict the type of exit occurring after path 
length t by means of different explanatory variables. Stratification allows for the use of 
more data compared to estimating a separate model for each exit-path duration. 
9 Productivity and profitability can also be measured by using operational assets (i.e. 
establishment costs, intangible fixed assets, property, plant and equipment, inventory, 
accounts receivable within one year, and transferred accounts) instead of total assets as the 
denominator. Sensitivity analyses for these alternative measures reveal no changes in the 
conclusions. We do not use a sales-based productivity and profitability measures, because 
only large firms are required to declare the level of sales in Belgium. 
10  Note that all firms in our population have survived the critical starting phase of 5 years. 
11  For example, when compared to manufacturing firms, service firms generally have less 
slack cash. This is because service firms usually generate sufficient cash flow and are able 
to absorb fluctuations in demand through increasing production, adding personnel, or 
decreasing inventory (Sharfman et al., 1988). 
12  81.5% of the exit observations are missing because firms often stop depositing annual 
accounts when approaching exit. In addition, companies may occasionally change their 
reporting periods and have shorter or longer reporting periods. All observations in the 
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dataset are rescaled for these irregularities so that they represent a period of exactly 12 
months. 
13  Note that the values for exit timing or exit path length may be biased downward, due to 
the restriction of the preexit observation window up to fiscal year 1990. 
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Table A.1: Calculation of the recurring profit/loss after taxes 
 Abbreviated scheme annual accounts Complete scheme annual accounts 
 Annual account 
section number 
Description Annual account 
section number 
Description 
Gross Margin  
 
│70/61│or│61/70│ 
 
Gross margin 
 
 (│70/74│ – 
│740│) –│60│–
│61│ 
 
 
Value of production (turnover less 
subsidies) – Intermediary 
consumption (commodities, raw 
materials, accessories, various goods 
and services) 
Operating expenses     
• Costs of personnel  <62> Remunerations, social 
contributions and pensions  
<62> 
+ <635> 
Remunerations, social contributions, 
pensions 
Pension provisions 
• Write-offs and 
depreciations of 
fixed assets 
│630│ 
 
Write-offs and depreciations on 
fixed assets: land, plant and 
equipment, establishment costs 
and intangible assets  
│630│ 
 
Write-offs and depreciations on fixed 
assets: land, plant and equipment, 
establishment costs and intangible 
assets  
Non-operating expenses     
• Financial costs of 
debts (excluding 
interest subsidies) 
– <65> + <656> Financial costs, excluding 
financial provisions 
│650│ 
│653│ 
Financial cost of debts 
Discount on receivables 
• Depreciations on 
current non-financial 
assets 
+ <631/4> 
 
Depreciations on inventories, 
orders in progress and accounts 
receivable 
+ <631/4> 
 
Depreciations on inventories, orders 
in progress and accounts receivable 
• Provisions for 
operational risks and 
costs 
+ <635/7> Provisions + <635/7> – 
<635> 
Provisions, excluding provisions for 
pensions 
Taxes     
Taxes on profits – <67/77> Taxes on the result │9134│ 
+ │640│ 
Taxes on the result of the fiscal year 
Taxes on operations (i.e. real estate 
taxes, taxes on cars and trucks, …) 
Recurring profit after taxes  [│70/61│ – │61/70│] – [ <62> + │630│ – <65> + 
<656> + <631/4> + <635/7> – <67/77>] 
[(│70/74│ – │740│) – (│60│ + │61│)] – [<62> + 
<635> + │630│ + │650│ + │653│ + <631/4> + 
<635/7> – <635> + │9134│ + │640│]  
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Table A.2: Regression results of the multinomial logistic regression model for voluntary liquidations and 
restructuring exits versus involuntary exits, using observations at the first sign of distress and at the time of exit 
 First sign of distress Time of exit 
 N = 6,058 N = 3,924 
 b coeff b coeff 
Voluntary liquidations 
Intercept –134.268** –143.238** 
CASH  
     4.733**       3.926** 
GROUP      1.963**       1.815** 
LEVERAGE   –1.962**   0.000 
D_NOGROUP            –0.127              –0.053 
SIZE   –0.112**     –0.212** 
SECURED      0.600**     0.986* 
PRODUCTIVITY            –0.005    –0.092** 
PROFITABILITY            –0.001  0.005 
AGE     0.020**      0.075** 
D_NOSECURED     0.621**      1.574** 
D_TRADE              0.022  0.105 
AGE*t     –0.006** 
PRODUCTIVITY*t       0.014** 
D_NOGROUP*t 0.009  0.074 
CASH*t   –0.379**  
LEVERAGE*t     0.165**  
Restructuring exits 
Intercept –133.051** –137.578** 
CASH  
   2.802*       2.136** 
GROUP       1.545**   0.472 
LEVERAGE    –2.196**             –0.003 
D_NOGROUP    –1.925**    –2.661** 
SIZE      0.299**      0.398** 
SECURED   0.086  0.135 
PRODUCTIVITY            –0.003  –0.085* 
PROFITABILITY              0.000  0.005 
AGE     0.015**    0.051* 
D_NOSECURED   0.367*      0.950** 
D_TRADE     0.225**  0.062 
AGE*t              –0.004 
PRODUCTIVITY*t     0.013* 
D_NOGROUP*t    0.142**      0.189** 
CASH*t           –0.292 
LEVERAGE*t   0.249** 
Goodness-of-fit 
Cox and Snell 0.191 0.382 
Nagelkerke R² 0.220 0.445 
McFadden R² 0.105 0.247 
LR-test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 
% correct classification 57.5% 68.2%a 
Asterisks indicate significance at the *0.05 and **0.01 level. 
a
 The most correct classification is for voluntary liquidations (88.5%) 
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Table 1: Composition of the sample 
Exit type Legal procedure Number of firms Percentage 
Involuntary exit   2,533 41.40% 
 * Bankruptcy 2,518 41.16% 
 * Compulsory liquidation 4 0.07% 
 * Moratorium on payments 11 0.17% 
Voluntary liquidation  2,700 44.13% 
 * Early dissolution/liquidation 465 7.60% 
 * Closure of liquidation 2,235 36.53% 
Restructuring exit  885 14.47% 
 * Acquisition  770 12.59% 
 * Merger 5 0.08% 
 * Split-up 110 1.80% 
TOTAL  6,118 100.00% 
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Figure 1: Distribution of exit path length for involuntary exits, voluntary liquidations and 
restructuring exits 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
57
 
Figure 2: The two-stage nested tree structure 
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58
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the explanatory and control variables at t = 1  
 
N Mean 
(median) 
total  
sample 
Mean 
(median) 
involuntary 
exit 
Mean 
(median) 
voluntary 
exit 
Sig. (p) 
Mann- 
Whitney 
U-test 
Sig. (p) 
t-test 
Mean 
(median)  
voluntary  
liquidation 
Mean  
(median) 
restructuring 
exit 
Sig. (p) 
Mann-
Whitney 
U-test 
Sig. (p) 
t-test 
Sig. (p) 
ANOVA 
F-test 
Sig. (p) 
Welch test 
Explanatory variables             
CASH 6118 0.096 
(0.040) 
0.072 
(0.027) 
0.113 
(0.052) 
0.000 0.000 0.127 
(0.061) 
0.070 
(0.033) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
GROUP 6118 0.056 
(0.000) 
0.017 
(0.000) 
0.083 
(0.000) 
0.000 0.000 0.055 
(0.000) 
0.168 
(0.000) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LEVERAGE 6118 0.802 
(0.766) 
0.960 
(0.853) 
0.694 
(0.671) 
0.000 0.000* 0.664 
(0.652) 
0.774 
(0.724) 
0.000 0.057* 0.001  0.001* 
SIZE as total assets (in 
thousands of €) 
6118 2164.399 
(263.597) 
977.722 
(252.095) 
3030.312 
(270.634) 
0.000 0.000 1999.515 
(207.536) 
6066.951 
(831.098) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SECURED 6118 0.092 
(0.000) 
0.112 
(0.000) 
0.079 
(0.000) 
0.000 0.000 0.075 
(0.000) 
0.088 
(0.000) 
0.000 0.078 0.000 0.000 
PRODUCTIVITY 6118 0.547 
(0.350) 
1.641 
(0.787) 
0.918 
(0.448) 
0.000 0.555* 0.891 
(0.505) 
0.999 
(0.270) 
0.000 0.067* 0.060 0.084 
PROFITABILITY 6118 -0.282 
(0.000) 
–0.315 
(–0.006) 
–0.415 
(0.007) 
0.000 0.298* –0.523 
(0.004) 
–0.084 
 (0.014) 
0.000 0.011 0.673  0.075* 
Control variables      
AGE (years) 6118 10.376 
(6.840) 
8.748 
(5.230) 
11.713 
(8.160) 
0.000 0.000 11.347 
(8.059) 
12.818 
(8.620) 
0.073 0.003 0.000 0.000 
t (years) 6118 7.54 
(8.00) 
7.53 
(8.00) 
7.54 
(8.00) 
0.037 0.791 7.47 
(8.00) 
7.77 
 (8.00) 
0.003 0.001 0.004 0.005 
 N N (%)  
non-zero 
values 
total  
sample 
N  (%) 
non-zero 
values 
involuntary 
exit 
N (%)  
non-zero 
values 
voluntary 
exit 
Sig. (p) 
χ² test   
N (%) 
non-zero  
values 
voluntary  
liquidation 
N (%) 
non-zero  
values 
restructuring 
exit 
Sig. (p) 
χ² test   
 
Explanatory variables      
D_NOGROUP  6118 5,352 
(87.480%) 
2,373 
(93.683%) 
2,979 
(83.096%) 
   0.000 2,406 
(89.111%) 
573 
(64.746%) 
0.000  
Control variables       
D_NOSECURED  6118 4,561 
(74.550%) 
1,739 
(68.654%) 
2,822 
(78.717%) 
 0.000 2,178 
(80.667%) 
644 
(72.768%) 
0.000  
D_TRADE 6118 2,893 
(47.287%) 
1,249 
(49.3%) 
 
1,644 
(45.9%) 
 
0.008  1,276  
(47.3%) 
 
368  
(41.6%) 
 
0.003  
D_MANUFACTURING 6118 1936 
(31.644%) 
864 
(34.110%) 
1,072 
(29.902%) 
   0.000  821  
(30.407%) 
251  
(28.361%) 
0.249  
* As indicated by Levene’s test for equality of variances (p > 0.05), equal variances are assumed.
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Table 3: Results of the NL model for Level 2 (voluntary exit versus involuntary exit) 
 First sign of distress Time of exit 
 b coeff exp(b) standard 
error 
p-value b coeff exp(b) standard 
error 
p-value 
IV  –0.0157 0.9844 0.3107 0.9598    0.1128 1.1194 0.1633 0.4899 
 
Available 
slack resources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CASH 4.4076**  82.0723 0.9696 <0.0001 3.4538**  31.6203 0.4403 <0.0001 
 
Potential 
slack resources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GROUP   1.7948**  6.0183 0.3172 <0.0001  0.9091**  2.4821 0.3497 0.0093 
LEVERAGE  –2.2562**  0.0772 0.2808 <0.0001  –0.00003  1.0000 0.000078 0.6744 
 
Control variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D_NOGROUP  –1.0125*  0.3633 0.4219 0.0164 –2.0064**  0.1345 0.6271 0.0014 
SIZE  –0.0104  0.9897 0.0957 0.9132    0.0107  1.0108 0.0767 0.8895 
SECURED 0.4817 * 1.6188 0.2380 0.0430    0.6260  1.8701 0.3442 0.0689 
PRODUCTIVITY  –0.0048  0.9952 0.0030 0.1156 –0.0871**  0.9166 0.0311 0.0051 
PROFITABILITY  –0.0014  0.9986 0.0042 0.7388    0.0036  1.0036 0.0047 0.4434 
AGE  0.0204**  1.0206 0.0030 <0.0001  0.0668**  1.0691 0.0178 0.0002 
D_NOSECURED  0.5789**  1.7841 0.1301 <0.0001  1.2701**  3.5612 0.1637 <0.0001 
D_TRADE  –0.0871  0.9166 0.0779 0.2633  –0.0998  0.9050 0.0865 0.2488 
 
Interactions with 
exit timing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CASH*t –0.3415**  0.7107 0.1057 0.0012     
LEVERAGE*t  0.2465**  1.2795 0.0323 <0.0001     
D_NOGROUP*t    0.0703  1.0728 0.0471 0.1354 0.1514 * 1.1635 0.0711 0.0333 
AGE*t      –0.0055**  0.9945 0.0021 0.0083 
PRODUCTIVITY*t      0.0129**  1.0130 0.0045 0.0040 
Asterisks indicate significance at the *0.05 and **0.01 level. 
 60 
 
Table 4: Results of the NL model for Level 1 (voluntary liquidation versus restructuring exit) 
 First sign of distress Time of exit 
 B coeff exp(b) Standard 
error 
p-value b coeff exp(b) Standard 
error 
p-value 
 
Relative efficiency of 
liquidation, compared 
to restructuring exit 
 
  
  
  
  
D_NOGROUP  0.9548**  2.5982 0.1270 <0.0001   2.0501** 7.7687 0.1743 <0.0001 
SIZE  –0.2909**  0.7476 0.0131 <0.0001 –0.5638** 0.5690 0.0208 <0.0001 
SECURED  0.8417**  2.3203 0.3252 0.0096    0.7026  2.0190 0.4587 0.1256
LEVERAGE  –0.0720  0.9305 0.0392 0.0664    0.0088** 1.0088 0.0012 <0.0001 
CASH    2.0472 **   7.7462    0.3705 <0.0001    2.1769** 8.8189    0.2756  <0.0001 
PRODUCTIVITY  –0.0029  0.9971 0.0067 0.6679  –0.0007  0.9993 0.0013 0.5780
PROFITABILITY  –0.0015  0.9985 0.0112 0.8943    0.0001  1.0001 0.0011 0.8967
 
Control variables 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
AGE    0.0019  1.0019 0.0036 0.5931    0.0056  1.0056 0.0045 0.2125
D_NOSECURED  0.5559**  1.7435 0.1442 0.0001    0.8743** 2.3972 0.1884 <0.0001 
GROUP    0.2880  1.3338 0.2115 0.1733    0.5627  1.7554 0.5913 0.3412
D_TRADE   0.2592 ** 1.2959 0.0853 0.0024    0.0442  1.0452 0.1040 0.6707
 
Interactions with 
exit timing 
 
  
  
 
 
 
GROUP*t        0.1472*  1.1586    0.0662 0.0263 
Asterisks indicate significance at the *0.05 and **0.01 level 
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Figure 3: Determinants of exit type 
 
 Distress-related exit 
 
 
Involuntary exit   Voluntary exit    LEVEL 2 
*Small cash holdings   *Large cash holdings     H1 confirmed 
*Weak group relations   *Strong group relations    H2 confirmed 
*High current leverage    *Low current leverage      H2 confirmed 
*Absence of group relations  *Presence of group relations   
*Presence of secured debts  *Absence of secured debts   
*Young age    *More mature      
 
 
  Voluntary liquidation  Restructuring exit            LEVEL 1 
*Absence of group relations   *Presence of group relations  H3 confirmed 
*Small size     *Large size           H3 confirmed 
*High secured debt level  *Low secured debt level        H3 confirmed 
*Large cash holdings   *Small cash holdings             H3 confirmed 
*Absence of secured debts  *Presence of secured debts 
*Trade firm     *Manufacturing or service firm 
 
